• 9 posts
  • 7 comments
Joined 4 months ago
Cake day: August 7th, 2026
  • Dumb as hell

    1. It age gates the internet for everyone meaning access to the internet is predicated upon government identification, privacy does not exist on any level

    2. It doesn’t work

    3. Even if it did there is no conclusive evidence it will help youth

    4. Australia pushed the ban hard so ONLINE GAMBLING companies could continue to advertise online

    5. Denying youth a way to connect with sympathetic peers (say for example you are a queer youth in a suffocatingly conservative small town) without immediately providing new functional alternatives is attempted mass manslaughter

Cinematographer Xenia Patricia, who shot Zodiac Killer Project and 100 Nights of Hero (both 2025), achieves a laser-sharp precision and painterly crispness with Filipiñana. Her takes make use of meticulously diffused natural light – more than half of Filipiñana is set outdoors – so that the full-bodied green vibrates with life and shadows are barely noticeable. The frames exude an arresting heat, so that the images on screen never feel flat – whether we’re in the extreme wide shots of the fairway and cart paths or the close-ups of Isabel’s face, which are often framed in between a golfer’s legs.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ca/post/73707647

From the servers that participated in the survey (over 400 servers that together represent a third of all known accounts on the fediverse) 65% of the fediverse servers operate at a loss every month, of the servers that reported this data, and all these servers collectively have €85k in monthly costs, against €37k in revenue. The majority of the work is unpaid, with 58% of the servers with over 10 accounts have moderation teams that are entirely voluntary. The legal environment continues to grow into a bigger challenge, and IFTAS notes how difficult it is for servers to to navigate rules like the EU’s Digital Services Act, the UK’s Online Safety Act and the US Take It Down Act, especially when you do not have a compliance team or legal counsel. The report calls for modular policies and practical guidance, and alongside that for regulatory carve-outs which recognise what small, non-commercial communities can realistically provide.

The personal cost is visible in the survey as well: over the preceding year, 27% of the respondents had felt like they were close to burnout, and another 14% experienced burn-out currently or in the past year. Notably the question asked for regarding mental health challenges “due to your community responsibilities in the past 12 months?” That 40% of operators, largely volunteers, experience the toll that managing community takes, shows the cost of running this network. In the qualitative responses, operators describe that being able to step away, and to trust that somebody else will take over, is a crucial protection for them. There is a strong demand for shared capacity and collaboration between server operators, with 67% of respondents want tools that allow people they trust from other server to have some form of moderator access, and 60% want to be able to delegate bot and spam defence to shared services. There is a strong preference for opt-in and federated moderation so the work can be shared, while allowing communities setting their own rules and stay independent.

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also interesting

Lula won Brazil’s presidential election over Bolsonaro, and the way that Lula came back to secure the victory in the second round of the elections gives a valuable perspective on political organising online. Garbage Day describes how André Janones had a WhatsApp channel called “Lula’s Army”, which turned Lula supporters into active distributors giving them concrete posting missions, instead of simply hoping theyd share the campaign material. Brazil is often at the fore-front of adoptions of digital networks, so I think its worth paying attention of how Brazilians are thinking about political organisation on commercial platforms. In that context, last month a group of Brazilian advocacy organisations (independent of the Lula campaign) published a Digital Contingency Plan, specifically about this dependency, and making sure organisations maintain control over their communications. Alquimídia, one of the driving organisations behind the plan, is an active promoter of the fediverse, and Thiago Skárnio, who helps to organise that outreach, says :”The strategy comes down to three movements: occupy closed platforms, preserve content in open media, and organise through secure networks. This means being present where the public is, but never depending exclusively on those spaces.” The fediverse is a practical part of that strategy, and Brazilian instance admins coordinated to temporarily open registration across four Brazilian instances of Comuna, Orgânica, Ursal and Bolha, to prevent all newcomes being concentrated on a single server alone.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ca/post/73100852

Our analysis contributes to ongoing debates on digital platforms, in particular from an institutional perspective, in the following ways. First, research on platforms has established a critical distinction between the organization of the platform host organization and the organization of the ‘crowd’ - the users who interact in digital action spaces (e.g., Ametowobla and Kirchner, 2023; Bauer and Gegenhuber, 2015; Dolata and Schrape, 2023). However, less attention has been paid to how certain features of platform organization such as centralized algorithmic control, data extraction mechanisms, and proprietary governance structures (e.g., Stark and Pais, 2020; Van Dijck, Poell, and De Waal, 2018) shape the public arena. Given that, in the case of social media platforms, the crowd comprises a large part of society, we demonstrate how the selective appropriation of institutional logics in the governance of platforms simultaneously subverts these logics in the public sphere.

Second, we highlight that these effects reflect strategic choices rather than technological inevitability, because platforms rhetorically appeal to the logics of the market, the corporation and the community to gain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), while diverging from these logics in the actual practices in which they create, regulate and monetize digital marketplaces. As an outlook, we point to alternative forms of platform organization more in line with liberal, democratic principles - while indicating a need to reform democratic societies away from a market towards a commons-based orientation (e.g. Etzioni, 2000, Etzioni, 2009). Social media platforms structured around decentralization rather than centralized control could lead to different dynamics in the public sphere and foster logics diversity (Almandoz and Thornton, 2025), granting communities more autonomy over content curation and moderation standards, enabling democratic deliberation rather than polarization, and allowing for distributed governance rather than proprietary control. In this sense, social media platforms and contestation around their governance constitute non-neutral battlegrounds where societal logics collide, are challenged, and can be transformed - in different directions.

The digital transformation can be seen as “the combined effects of several digital innovations bringing about novel actors (and actor constellations), structures, practices, values, and beliefs that change, threaten, replace or complement existing rules of the game within organizations and fields” (Hinings, Gegenhuber, and Greenwood, 2018: 53). Digital platforms can be seen as a constitutive feature of late digital society, and terms such as platform economy (Kenney and Zysman, 2016) or platform capitalism (Srnicek, 2017; Staab, 2019) indicate a broader societal and economic transformation associated with the spread of platform organizations. In a platform-mediated society, economic as well as social processes are shaped by globally operating platform companies such as Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta, or Microsoft, leading to the commodification of both private and public exchanges (Dolata, 2019; Van Dijck et al., 2018). This development not only marks the endpoint of the ‘organization society’ that Pfeffer (1997) described in the introductory quote (Davis, 2016), but undermines democratic principles because an algorithmically governed social order creates new participation possibilities, while restricting participation in decision-making (Stalder, 2016). Users on most platforms have limited to no control over the conditions under which they work (e.g., Maric, Schuessler, and Thäter, 2025).

Digital platforms are commonly defined as technology-enabled infrastructures operated by host organizations to facilitate the exchange between providers and consumers of goods, services, or knowledge (Gawer, 2010). It is important to distinguish the platform host organization - typically a rather small, formal organization often embedded in multinational technology companies - from structures and practices of platform organizing, which shape the dynamics of market, crowd or community transactions (Bauer and Gegenhuber, 2015; Kirchner and Schuessler, 2019; Langner and Seidel, 2015). Dolata and Schrape (2023) hence distinguish the platform-operating companies from the technologically mediated social action space that is typically referred to as the ‘platform’ (similarly Ametowobla and Kirchner, 2023). While initially narratives about sharing, autonomy, flexibility, openness, fluidity, and peer production accompanied the rise of the platform organization, dominant narratives now emphasize data extraction and processing, algorithmic governance, surveillance, social stratification (Fourcade, 2021; Healy, Nicholson, and Pekarek, 2017; Zuboff, 2018) as well as platform domination, power, centralization and control (Seemann, 2021; Kenney, Bearson, and Zysman, 2021; Schuessler, Attwood-Charles, Kirchner, and Schor, 2021). Platform governance is often described as ‘hybrid’, because it uses market, corporation and community mechanisms to coordinate crowds via a digital infrastructure (e.g. Kornberger, 2016; Zhang et al., 2024).

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Our study contributes to ongoing debates on digital platforms and institutional logics in several ways. First, by shifting our analysis from gig work platforms operating on a national or field-level to globally operating social media platforms, we show how platforms’ hybrid use of institutional logics (Frenken et al., 2020; Grabher and K¨onig, 2020; Watkins and Stark, 2018; Zhang et al., 2025) has repercussions for the public sphere. Hence, we support critical analyses of platforms’ regulatory power (e.g. Lehdonvirta, 2022), complementing these analyses with an organization-theoretical perspective that shows how the governance of the platform host or- ganization extends to the ways in which platforms organize crowds, yielding them significant power to play with and undermine societal-level institutional logics given their influence over the public sphere.

Second, we respond to recent calls for using the institutional logics framework to understand current challenges to the liberal- capitalist, democratic institutional order (Lounsbury and Wang, 2020), revealing the role played by certain kinds of platforms in undermining its institutional pillars. While symbolically adopting the rhetoric of the logic of the market, the corporation and the community to gain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), large, centralized and profit-driven social media platforms decompose the means and ends of these logics in the specific ways in which they create, regulate and monetize markets (Yan et al., 2021), thereby redefining not just the composition of dominant logics in society, but also their meanings and associated practices (Schildt and Kodeih, 2025). Arguably, platforms’ strategic and subversive use of institutional logics is possible and impactful because users lack situated interaction possibilities in digital spaces. Such interactions are an important source of resistance to a manipulative use of institutional logics, because they allow detecting and acting upon a lack of coherence in logics (Zilber, 2024).

Federated social platforms like Mastodon and Bluesky are growing alternatives to centralized social media. Their moderation actions cross servers, lists and labelers in ways users cannot easily see. When something visibly changes, users turn to public forums like Reddit to ask why. We read these discussions as folk theories of federated moderation: accounts users build from observation and discussion with each other. We pair manual qualitative coding with LLM-assisted labeling using Gemma 4 (for extending the analysis across a larger set) to map how users explain moderation across five federated-platform subreddits. Two cases stand out: defederation on Mastodon, where users settle on a few recurring reasons, and list propagation on Bluesky, where users report being mass-blocked via a stranger’s subscription list. We close with two design changes that would surface these explanations on the platform itself rather than on Reddit.

Federated social media has grown noticeably over the past few years. Mastodon and Bluesky are the most visible cases, alongside Lemmy as a Reddit alternative, with millions of accounts either migrating from centralized platforms or signing up directly [6]. Unlike centralized platforms, federated platforms divide moderation work across many independent instances and, on Bluesky, across user-subscribed lists and labelers. This division makes moderation outcomes harder for ordinary users to see: an account can be defederated by a server its owner has never heard of, or added to a block list curated by someone they have never spoken to. A new Mastodon user usually does not know which other servers their instance has cut ties with. A new Bluesky user often does not know which labelers their app trusts by default, or that a stranger curating a list can add their account and quietly lower their reach. When something visibly breaks (an account goes dark, replies fail to land), people often take the question to Reddit. The answers that come back vary, from accurate to confidently wrong.

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The contrast between the two cases also shows that folk theories of federation are not generic. The dimensions users reach for in each case track what their protocol makes visible to them. On Mastodon they reach for the admin and the question of how far admin power extends, because the admin is the named human role in their experience of the platform. On Bluesky they reach for the list curator and the mechanics of subscription, because lists and labelers are the named user-side mechanism the protocol exposes. Where prior folk-theory work has studied a single algorithm that users cannot see [5, 7], we look at two architectures that are equally invisible from the outside but lead users to ask different questions. This protocol-shaped variation is what makes the federated setting useful for extending folk-theory work beyond centralized platforms.

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One might ask whether good in-product documentation removes the need for a venue like Reddit. We think not: much of what users explain is exactly what a single platform cannot narrate, a defederation decided by another server, or a block inherited from a stranger’s list, and even for its own actions, the threads do what documentation cannot, letting users compare protocols, correct each other in real time (our D4 subset), and read an event through people who have met it before. In-product explanations would give this cooperative reading a starting point, not replace it.

Our population is not federated-platform users in general but a self-selected slice: people engaged enough with fediverse governance to write about it in public. Unlike the users caught off guard by feed curation in Eslami et al. [7], ours had already chosen to explain moderation policy, so they are more technically literate than a median Mastodon or Bluesky user and their folk theories likely sit closer to the actual protocol mechanism. Our claims are thus about fediverse-engaged Redditors, not federated-platform users at large; native conversations on Bluesky, Mastodon, Discord and GitHub are likewise out of reach here. Reddit threads show public reasoning, not private experience and not the ground truth of what the platform did. Our claims concern how users describe federated moderation, not platform behavior we tested directly. The next step is to widen the sample with a held-out audit and to extend the codebook to a third protocol family (e.g., Nostr) so the two-case story can be tested against a setting we have not yet read.